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VIETNAM: ENDLESS WAR

THE EDITORS

PACIFISM AND VIOLENCE

CHRISTOPHER CAUDWELL

Pentagonism or Imperialism?

By RICHARD DU BOFF

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

In the "Reply" to Charles Bettelheim in the March issue, Gilles Martinet is referred to as Professor Bettelheim's "friend." A reader has inquired whether this is to be interpreted politically or personally. The answer is personally. On many political issues the two men have profound differences.

Through a typographical error, a non-sequitur was introduced into the article on Brazil's Northeast by Kit Sims Taylor in the March issue. In the text, the following passage occurs: "Marx, in his chapter entitled 'The Modern Theory of Colonization,' told the story of a Mr. Peel, who took 3,000 'persons of the working class—men, women, and children—to Australia, expecting them to work on his plantations. But, with land available for the taking, the laborers preferred to start their own farms, and Mr. Peel

(*Continued on inside back cover*)

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VIETNAM: ENDLESS WAR

A report from Washington in the *New York Times* of March 8 states:

> A State Department official who recently returned from speaking engagements at a number of universities was amazed that the students, who only six months ago were lambasting Washington for its Vietnam policy, hardly brought the subject up. Public pressure over the war has almost disappeared.

This surely remarkable state of affairs has obviously not been brought about because the fighting has stopped or even, on the average, greatly diminished. Casualties have been consistently over 200 Americans killed every week, and as we write in early March they are running around twice that figure. Nor is there any reason to believe that the reason is that people generally, and those who were previously such vocal protesters against the war in particular, have suddenly become convinced that the war is any more deserving of their support than it was a year ago. In this respect absolutely nothing has changed. What then is the reason?

Evidently that the American public, including most of the Left, expects that the Paris talks are really going to lead to a negotiated settlement in the reasonably near future.

The basis of this expectation is not the same for everyone. Probably a majority of the people believe what the government tells them, that it is earnestly seeking peace and that the military situation is such that the other side has no choice but to accept what Washington calls an "honorable" settlement. On this interpretation, the dragging out of the negotiations is due to the Communists' hope of winning at Paris what they have not been able to win on the battlefield. When they are convinced

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that this is impossible, they will be ready for an acceptable compromise.

Very few people on the Left, however, can base their expectation of an early end to the war on such grounds. The Left has learned to distrust just about everything the government says about Vietnam; for the most part it knows that what Washington has all along called an "honorable" peace means the maintenance of a neocolonial puppet regime in South Vietnam; and it also knows that it is precisely this noncompromisable issue of neocolonialism versus national liberation which has been at the heart of the struggle from the very beginning. On what, then, does the Left base its expectation of an early end?

The answer seems to be that the Left, or at any rate that part of it which until recently constituted the core of the anti-war movement, is convinced of two things: (1) that the continuation of the war is causing increasingly serious damage to the vital interests of the U.S. ruling class, undermining the international position of the dollar, and squandering resources which might be used to allay the country's mounting racial and urban crises; and (2) that the ruling class always bases its policies and actions on a rational calculation of what best serves its vital interests. *Ergo* the ruling class must want to end the war soon and can be expected to do so even though the price has to be withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. A good statement of this position is given in Richard Du Boff's generally excellent review of Juan Bosch's latest book, printed elsewhere in this issue of MR (p. 25 below):

> The elders of the system . . . have clearly had enough. Wall Street, the multinational corporations, the foundation technocrats, the major news media, the international bankers all understand that the Vietnam intervention was essentially "correct," but that the tenacity of Vietnamese resistance was disastrously underestimated. The military and its civilian spokesmen sold them a bill of goods, and its cost has become unbearably high. The enterprise has got to be liquidated—and it probably will be.

The first difficulty with this theory is that it was just as applicable a year ago as it is now, and as a matter of fact it was freely used by leftists to explain Johnson's speech of March 31,

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1968, curtailing the bombing of North Vietnam and offering to open peace talks. We were told then, too, that the ruling class had had enough and was about to throw in the towel. However, it must be recognized that a theory of this sort is not necessarily disproved by a lack of confirmation in a period as short as a year; its advocates can and do point to a variety of factors which may have contributed to the postponement of the expected action, and it is impossible to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that some combination of these factors has not in fact played the role assigned to it. Those of us who believe the theory is wrong—and have so believed right along—must go beyond pointing out that it hasn't worked that way to an attack on the theory itself.

To begin with, we do not disagree with what was designated above as the first element of the theory in question: continuation of the war *is* causing increasingly serious damage to the vital interests of the U.S. ruling class. What is *not* correct is that the ruling class—in this country today or in any other country at any other time—always bases its policies on a rational calculation of what best serves its vital interests.

What are involved here are issues of great complexity which unfortunately have been sadly neglected by the social sciences. We have a plethora of studies of the *composition* of various ruling classes, but few if any studies of the determinants and dynamics of the *behavior* of ruling classes. In these circumstances there has been a strong tendency to substitute formulas and myths for knowledge and analysis. The ruling class is frequently treated as though it were a person, endowed in the same way with a mind and will of its own. Or it is assumed to have an all-powerful directorate which meets in secret to manipulate the levers of power. C. Wright Mills's theory of the "power elite," though seemingly more sophisticated, in reality is very similar in reducing class behavior to the behavior of a specified group of individuals. Once this reduction has been made, by whatever means, all that we know or think we know about how and why individuals act can be brought to bear on the problem of class behavior. And the result is quite likely to be all wrong.

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This is not because classes do not act through individuals: of course they do. The error lies in assuming that people think and act the same way in their capacity as members of a class as they do in their capacity as private individuals. It is easy to show that this is not so. Take, for example, the question of a resort to violence. People who in their private lives would be horrified at the idea of killing another human being have no hesitation in advocating and participating in mass murder when they believe it to be in the national (i.e. ruling-class) interest. Nor is the method of conceiving interests and their relative importance the same in private as it is in class matters. Many illustrations of the kind of differences we have in mind could be given, but it hardly seems necessary in the present context. The single fact that people can simultaneously condemn murder and condone war is by itself enough to prove the necessity of a theory of class behavior quite separate from any theory or theories of individual behavior.

This is naturally not the place to try to present a theory of class behavior, but we do need to call attention to certain factors which would certainly enter into such a theory and without which it is impossible to understand the attitudes and policies of the U.S. ruling class toward Vietnam.

First, every ruling class *necessarily* generates an ideology —in the specific sense of an ensemble of ideas and morals and rationalizations—which serves to justify and legitimize its privileges and power. Much of this ideology is what Engels seems to have been the first to call "false consciousness": it misrepresents or distorts reality in order to convince exploited classes and peoples of the justice and inevitability of their fate. But, and this is the decisive point from our present angle of vision, it also and equally necessarily impairs the ability of the ruling class in question (and its assorted educators and publicists) to understand the historical situation in which it has its being.

Second, the fact that it does have its being in a given historical context means that the policies it devises and the actions it takes to protect and promote its interests depend in a crucially important way on its necessarily faulty interpretation of the dominant historical forces and trends of its epoch.

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If the foregoing propositions are accepted, it follows that it can only be misleading to suppose that a ruling class can, still less that it actually does, base its actions on a rational calculation of what is likely to serve its interests most effectively —in the manner, say, of a businessman deciding on the basis of cost and market data whether or not to bring out a new line of products.

This is not to imply that a ruling class is ignorant of its interests. Its highest and, in case of conflict, overriding interest is preservation of the system in which its power and privileges are rooted; and in the case of most ruling classes scarcely lower priority is accorded to the expansion of that system. What we are saying is that pursuit of these goals involves dealing not with measurable data such as costs and prices and profits but rather with historic forces and trends which can never be traced and foreseen, even by the best of analysts, except within fairly wide limits, and which are bound to be interpreted by ruling classes with varying degrees of ideological error. It is therefore entirely wrong to assume that ruling-class policies are formulated on the basis of a rational and reliable comprehension of the realities of a given situation. The truth is that these policies can be understood and anticipated only through analyzing and making full allowance for the elements of error and irrationality which enter into them.

There are two further factors which have to be taken into account in dealing with ruling-class behavior. The first is the tremendous importance of what may be called momentum. When a certain decision is taken and a corresponding course of action is embarked upon, it may at first be done in a tentative and readily reversible way. But the longer it is persisted in and the wider and deeper the commitments which come to be involved, the harder it is to call a halt or turn aside. The second factor is the familiar one of "face." Ruling classes by definition are concerned with power, and power is a complicated phenomenon. It certainly does, in Chairman Mao's words, grow out of the barrel of a gun, but its extent and durability are affected by other factors, such as ability to satisfy people's needs, to overawe them, to command their admiration or respect. And in this

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complex, face—itself a mixture of success, credibility, and dignity—plays a significant part. The bigger a miscalculation and the more dire its threatened consequences, the greater is the motivation for a ruling class to try to recoup rather than admit it was wrong. In some circumstances, to be sure, the reason for wanting to save face may be merely false pride; but this is by no means always the case: the loss of face stemming from a serious defeat can dangerously undermine the power of a ruling class.

Before considering the U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the light of these observations on factors entering into the determination of ruling-class behavior, we want to emphasize a point which is perhaps obvious enough but which nevertheless is too often overlooked or neglected: History is full of examples of ruling classes which have failed to find their way out of crises and have consequently suffered terrible, and often fatal, disasters. And in many cases—perhaps even in all cases—there were prominent members of the doomed class who could clearly read the handwriting on the wall and yet were either unwilling or unable to intervene to alter the course of events. Only think of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century! Twice within a period of twenty-five years the German ruling class embarked on a career of unbridled conquest and expansion, and twice it suffered total defeat. Nor is it only hindsight that enables us to say that both efforts were foredoomed. What the British historian A. J. P. Taylor says about the first would be equally applicable to the second:

> There existed in Germany in the First World War forces which repudiated [the] program of conquest and sought an alternative. The first of these forces came from all those members of the "governing classes"—intelligent industrialists, skeptical generals, rigid Junkers, competent bureaucrats, [the Chancellor] himself—who believed that Germany could not win the war; but as a peace without victory raised even more terrifying problems than endless war, their opposition counted for nothing. They regretted, they lamented, they complained; but they acquiesced in every step taken to achieve a world conquest which they believed impossible.*

* A. J. P. Taylor, *The Course of German History*, Putnam's, 1962, p. 192.

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Let us turn now to the problem of the U.S. ruling class's Vietnam policy. The original involvement, in the late 1940's and early 1950's, was ostensibly to help the French reassert control over their prewar Indo-Chinese colony, but its real long-run purpose was undoubtedly to enable the Americans to replace the French as overlords in that part of the world. After the French defeat and withdrawal in 1954, the U.S. decided to settle for a Korea-type division of Vietnam, installing a neo-colonial puppet regime in Saigon and contemptuously flouting the Geneva accords which had brought the fighting to an end. This decision and the subsequent efforts to make it stick were unquestionably based upon an ideologically conditioned failure to understand the historical realities of the Vietnamese situation. The Vietnamese were thought of as inferior "natives" who would either be overawed by U.S. power or welcome its protection. The revolutionary aspect of the resistance to French rule was merely the local manifestation of the world Communist conspiracy with headquarters in Moscow (later moved to Peking). Because of these and related misconceptions, the U.S. ruling class figured that it would be easy to establish and maintain in South Vietnam a strategically located center of American imperial interests for all Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

Later the character of the involvement changed. The puppet regime degenerated and by the second half of 1964 was on the verge of collapse. Faced with the choice of getting out of Vietnam altogether or Americanizing the war, Washington took the second course. Once again, ideologically conditioned miscalculations came into play: surely American soldiers with their enormously superior equipment and firepower would be able to finish off the raggle-taggle guerrillas in short order.

That was four years ago, and the guerrillas are militarily and politically stronger than ever. On the U.S. side a process of disillusionment, the beginnings of which can be traced back to even before the Americanization of the war, has already gone far: the elders of the system, as Du Boff rightly points out in the review referred to on page 2 above, have indeed had enough and would dearly love to liquidate the whole enterprise.

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But by now the factors of momentum and face, both of which militate against any settlement which would exclude the American presence in South Vietnam, have acquired formidable dimensions.

The thing about the momentum factor which is most interesting is that it rests in large part on interests which have been created and blown up by and in the course of U.S. intervention itself. It has frequently been pointed out by critics of the thesis that the war in Vietnam has imperialist motives and aims that when the United States got involved American business had almost no interests in that country or the surrounding area. That was true fifteen years ago, but it is no longer true today. Many U.S. corporations and consortia of corporations have moved into South Vietnam, including the two biggest U.S. banks,* some of the country's largest construction firms, etc. And during the same years, U.S. business and finance have invaded and spread throughout the entire area from Thailand on the northwest to Australia and New Zealand on the southeast. But vested interests in the Vietnam war are by no means confined to Vietnam and the surrounding region: after all, most of the $30 billion added to the country's military budget as a direct consequence of the war is spent in the United States and nourishes in greater or lesser degree most of the country's military-industrial complex. Add to these facts that many states and congressional districts are economically and politically tied up with Vietnam-connected largesse and that an enormous bureaucracy both in the Pentagon and in various civilian government agencies is geared to the war's continuation—add all this up and you can begin to appreciate the fantastic momentum which now weighs against any drastic shifts in ruling-class policy toward Vietnam.

The factor of face is perhaps even more important. In 1954 it would have been relatively easy for the United States to write Vietnam off, just as China had been written off as lost by the Truman administration in 1949. But from then on it has become progressively more difficult. The Saigon regime became

* See Harry Magdoff, "The Age of Imperialism," Part II, MR, October, 1968, pp. 18-19.

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a U.S. puppet and as such was the recipient of all kinds of open and implied promises of aid and protection: any failure to keep these promises could not but contribute to undermining the relations between the United States and literally dozens of puppets and clients all over the globe. Still it might have been possible to wriggle out as long as the U.S. military posture in South Vietnam was that of adviser and helper: it could have been claimed, quite correctly, that the South Vietnam regime had shown itself incapable of using U.S. advice and aid effectively and that this released the United States from all further obligations. But once the war had been Americanized the whole problem underwent a qualitative change. It was no longer a weak and shaky government of a backward half-country against the Communists but the mighty, all-powerful United States of America against the armed forces of a country with about 15 percent of the U.S. population and an infinitesimal percentage of the per capita income. For the United States to admit defeat under these circumstances—and we should be clear that withdrawal from Vietnam would be precisely that—would entail a loss of face on a scale the world has probably never seen before. The Chinese contention that the United States is a paper tiger would be proved to the hilt, and every radical and revolutionary movement around the world would be encouraged to believe that what had been accomplished in Vietnam could, sooner or later, be duplicated everywhere else. Much as the elders might want to liquidate the war, they could only contemplate consequences of this sort with extreme misgivings and consternation.

We seem to have reached a situation now comparable to that in Germany during the First World War described in the above quotation from A. J. P. Taylor: as for the dissenting Germans of that time, so for our unhappy elders of today "a peace without victory raises even more terrifying problems than endless war." Only, for our elders matters are even worse, the alternative to endless war being not peace without victory but defeat. No wonder they opt for endless war.

And, make no mistake, endless war is the right name for the policy of the U.S. government today, as it has been for

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the past year. The issues in the "great debate" which took place behind the scenes in Washington during the month of March 1968—described in detail in two long stories in the *New York Times* of March 6 and 7—were not war or peace: they were escalation or continuation of the war at roughly the current level. And the decision went against escalation (and against the Pentagon) because the elders saw the prospects of success as dim and the costs in terms of vital ruling-class interests as prohibitive. But so far as we know, there is not a shred of evidence—certainly not in the *New York Times* stories—that anyone with access to the levers of power has at any time favored ending the war in Vietnam on the only terms it can be ended. Neither escalation nor withdrawal: this is a formula for endless war.

Not that endless war will really be endless in Vietnam any more than it was in Europe a half century earlier. It may therefore be useful to recall what it was that finally brought Germany to the end of her rope: military defeat at the front and rebellion in the rear.

We believe that it will be these same forces—and not costs or casualties or threats to the dollar—which will bring an end to the war in Vietnam. If we are right, the implications for the antiwar movement, and especially for the Left within the antiwar movement, are both obvious and profound.

(March 10, 1969)

It is wrong to demand respect and obedience for the law by the poor, the black community, and political radicals, and simultaneously condone and even encourage disregard for the law on the Right, by politicians, by government officials, and by police and other law enforcement agencies.

—Corliss Lamont

Q. Recently, questions have been raised in this country about the legal aspects of what we are doing in Vietnam. What is our justification under international law?

A. To me, the legal aspect of it is the least significant.

—From an interview with Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. News & World Report, February 15, 1965

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PACIFISM AND VIOLENCE: A STUDY IN BOURGEOIS ETHICS

BY CHRISTOPHER CAUDWELL

This is an abridgment of a chapter from Christopher Caudwell's well-known work, *Studies in a Dying Culture* (London: The Bodley Head, 1938). Both the abridging and the introduction were done by Tom Christoffel, who reviewed the Kerner Commission Report in MR, October 1968 and is currently co-editing *Radical Perspectives on Social Change,* a book of readings.

The abridgment is published by permission of T. Stanhope Sprigg, executor of the author's estate. Punctuation, capitalization, italicization are that of the original.—The Editors.

Christopher Caudwell (Christopher St. John Sprigg) died on February 12, 1937, while attempting to hold a hill above the Jarama River for the Spanish Republicans. He was twenty-nine years old.

Caudwell fought in Spain because, for him, "what I feel about the importance of democratic freedom," had to be matched with action. During his short lifetime this same impulse for action provoked a remarkable spurt of intellectual creativity which produced one serious novel, five books on aviation, seven detective stories, numerous short stories and poems, and his three major efforts: *Illusion and Reality: A Study of the Sources of Poetry, The Crisis in Physics,* and *Studies in a Dying Culture.* After his death several collections of his scattered works were published, including *Further Studies in a Dying Culture.*

Studies in a Dying Culture is a collection of essays dealing with seemingly diverse topics: George Bernard Shaw, T. E. Lawrence, D. H. Lawrence, H. G. Wells, Pacifism and Violence, Love, Freud, and Liberty. But all are united by the theme of

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human liberty and by Caudwell's thoughtful Marxist critique of bourgeois culture and ideology. To many a contemporary genteel ear, Caudwell's formulations may have a harsh and unpleasantly dogmatic ring. The fact is, his crisp Anglo-Saxon directness can provide a useful antidote to the opaque, Central European Hegelianizings of Marcuse, Lukacs, and Adorno, now held in such esteem by numerous "New Left theorists."

Within Marxist circles a certain aura and mystique have clung to Caudwell's name since his death. "Caudwell"—the name evokes the works which might have been had the man chosen not to leave the study for the anti-fascist battlefields. His choice, and its consequences, lend an added power to the works he did complete.

The pacifism Caudwell subjects to criticism in the following essay is not identical with the various forms of New Left pacifism in America today. Nevertheless, the main lines of his critique assume a special relevance in the context of the transition which pacifist theory and practice are presently experiencing.

—Tom Christoffel

Pacifism, always latent in the bourgeois creed, has now crystallized out as almost the only emotionally charged belief left in Protestant Christianity or in its analogue, bourgeois "idealism."

I call it a distinctively bourgeois doctrine, because I mean by pacifism, not the love of peace as a good to be secured by a definite form of action, but the belief that any form of social constraint of others or any violent action is in itself wrong, and that violence such as war must be *passively* resisted because to use violence to end violence would be logically self-contradictory. I oppose pacifism in this sense to the Communist belief that the only way to secure peace is by a revolutionary change in the social system, and that ruling classes resist revolution violently and must therefore be overthrown by force.

Bourgeois pacifism is distinctive and should not be confused, for example, with Eastern pacifism, any more than modern European warfare should be confused with feudal warfare. It is not merely that the social manifestations of it are

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different—this would necessarily arise from the different social organs of the two cultures. But the content also is different. The historic example of bourgeois pacifism is not Gandhi but Fox. The Society of Friends expresses the spirit of bourgeois pacifism. It is individual resistance.

To understand how bourgeois pacifism arises, we must understand how bourgeois violence arises. It arises, just as does feudal or despotic violence, from the characteristic economy of the system. As was first explained by Marx, the characteristics of bourgeois economy are that the bourgeois, held down and crippled productively by the feudal system, comes to see freedom and productive growth in lack of social organization, in every man's administering his own affairs for his own benefit to the best of his ability and desire, and this is expressed in the absolute character of bourgeois property together with its complete alienability. His struggle to achieve this right did secure his greater freedom and productive power as compared with his position in the feudal system. The circumstances of the struggle and its outcome gave rise to the bourgeois dream—freedom as the absolute elimination of social relations.

But such a program, if carried into effect, would mean the end of society and the breakdown of economic production. Each man would struggle for himself, and if he saw another man with something he wanted, he would seize it, for by assumption no such social relations as cooperation exist. The saving and foresight which make economic production possible would cease to exist. Man would become a brute.

But in fact the bourgeois had no desire for such a world. He lived by merchandising and banking, by *capital* as opposed to the land which was the basis of feudal exploitation. Therefore, he meant by the "absence of social restraint" the absence of any restraint on his ownership, alienation, or acquisition at will of the capital by which he lived. Private property is a social "restraint," for others not owning it are "restrained" from helping themselves to it by force or cunning, as they could in a "state of nature"; but the bourgeois never included the ownership of capital as one of the social restraints that should be abolished, for the simple reason that it was not to him a

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restraint at all. It never therefore entered his head to regard it as such, and he saw nothing inconsistent in calling for the abolition of privilege, monopoly, and so forth, while hanging on to his capital.

Moreover, he had a cogent argument which, when he became more self-conscious, he could use. A social restraint is a social relation, that is, a relation between men. The relation between master and slave is a social relation and therefore a restraint on the liberty of one man by the other. In the same way the relation between lord and serf is a relation between men and a restraint on human liberty; but the relation between a man and his property is a relation between man and a thing, and is therefore no restraint on the liberty of other men.

This argument was of course fallacious, for there can be no universal relations of this kind as the fabric of society, there can only be relations between men disguised as relations between things. The bourgeois defense of private property only applies if I go out into the woods and pick up a stick to walk with, or fashion an ornamental object for my adornment; it applies to the possession of socially unimportant trifles or things for immediate consumption. As soon as bourgeois possession extends to the capital of the community, consisting of the products of the community set aside to produce goods in the future (in early bourgeois civilization, grain, clothes, seed, and raw materials to supply the laborers of tomorrow, and in addition machinery and plant for the same purpose today), this relation to a thing becomes a relation among men, for it is now the labor of the community which the bourgeois controls. This social relation is only made possible by—it *depends on*—the bourgeois ownership of capital. Thus, just as in slave-owning or serf-owning civilization there is a relation between men which is a relation between a dominating and a dominated class, or between exploiters and exploited, so there is in bourgeois culture; but whereas in earlier civilizations this relation between men is conscious and clear, in bourgeois culture it is disguised as a system free from obligatory dominating relations between men and containing only innocent relations between men and a thing.

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Therefore, in throwing off all social restraint, the bourgeois seemed to himself justified in retaining this one restraint of private property, for it did not seem to him a restraint at all, but an inalienable right of man, the fundamental natural right. Unfortunately for this theory, there are no natural rights, only situations found in nature, and private property protected for one man by others is not one of them. Bourgeois private property could only be protected by coercion—the *have-nots* had to be coerced by the *haves,* after all, just as in feudal society. Thus a dominating relation as violent as in slave-owning civilizations came into being, expressed in the police, the laws, the standing army, and the legal apparatus of the bourgeois state. The whole bourgeois state revolves round the coercive protection of private property, alienable and acquirable by trading for private profit, and regarded as a natural right, but a right which, strangely enough, can only be protected by coercion, because it involves of its essence a right to dispose of and extract profit from the labor-power of others, and so administer their lives.

Thus, after all, the bourgeois dream of liberty cannot be realized. Social restraints must come into being to protect this one thing that makes him a bourgeois. This "freedom" to own private property seems to him inexplicably to involve more and more social restraints, laws, tariffs, and factory acts; and this "society" in which only relations to a thing are permitted becomes more and more a society in which relations between men are elaborate and cruel. The more he aims for bourgeois freedom, the more he gets bourgeois restraint, for bourgeois freedom is an illusion.

The whole bourgeois economy is built on the violent domination of men by men through the private possession of social capital. As long as the bourgeois economy remains a positive constructive force, that violence is hidden. Society does not contain a powerful internal pressure until productive forces have outgrown the system of productive relations.

But when bourgeois economy is riven by its own contradictions, when private profit is seen to be public harm, when poverty and unemployment grow in the midst of the means of plenty, bourgeois violence becomes more open. These contradic-

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tions drive the bourgeois states to imperialistic wars, in which violence reigns without a qualifying factor. Internally, violence instead of "reason" alone suffices to maintain the bourgeois system. Since the capitalistic system is openly proving its inefficiency, people are no longer content with a form of government, parliamentary democracy, in which economic production is run by the bourgeois class, leaving the people as a whole only the power to settle, within narrow limits, through parliament, the apportionment of a merely administrative budget. They see this to be a sham, and see no reason to tolerate the sham. There is a growing demand for socialism, and the capitalist class where this grows pressing, resorts to open violence. They use the revolt against ineffectual democracy to establish a dictatorship, and this dictatorship, which seizes power with the cry "Down with Capitalism," in fact establishes capitalism still more violently, as in fascist Italy and Germany. The brutal oppression and cynical violence of fascism is the summit of bourgeois decline. The violence at the heart of the bourgeois illusion emerges inside as well as outside the state.

The justification of bourgeois violence is an important part of bourgeois ethics. The coercive control of social labor by a limited class is justified as a relation to a thing. Even as late as Hegel, this justification is given quite naively and simply. Just as I go out and break off a stick of wood from the primitive jungle and convert it to my purpose, so the bourgeois is supposed to convert the thing "capital" to his use. Domination over men is wicked; domination over things is legitimate.

Bourgeois ethics include the more difficult task of justification of the violence of bourgeois war. The Christian-bourgeois ethic has been equal even to this. Consonant to the bourgeois illusion, all interference with the liberty of another is wicked and immoral. If one is attacked in one's liberty, one is therefore compelled to defend outraged morality and attack in turn. All bourgeois wars are therefore justified by both parties as wars of defense. Bourgeois liberty includes the right to exercise all bourgeois occupations—alienating, trading, and acquiring for profit—and since these involve establishing dominating relations over others, it is not surprising that the bourgeois often

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finds himself attacked in his liberty. It is impossible for the bourgeois to exercise his full liberty without infringing the liberty of another. It is impossible therefore to be thoroughly bourgeois and not give occasion for "just" wars.

Meanwhile bourgeois discomforts generate an opposition to bourgeois violence. At each stage of bourgeois development men could be found who were impregnated with the bourgeois illusion that man is free and happy only when without social restraints, and who yet found in bourgeois economy multiplying coercions and restraints. We saw why these exist; the bourgeois economy requires coercion and restraint for its very life. The big bourgeois dominates the *petit bourgeois,* just as both dominate the proletariat. But these early bourgeois rebels could not see this. They demanded a return to the bourgeois dream—"equal rights for all," "freedom from social restraints," the "natural rights" of men. They thought that this would free them from the big bourgeoisie, and give them equal competition once again.

Thus originated the cleavage between conservatives and liberals, between the big bourgeois in possession and the little bourgeois wishing to be in possession. The one sees that his position depends on maintaining things as they are; the other sees his as depending on more bourgeois freedom, more votes for all, more freedom for private property to be alienated, acquired, and owned, more free competition, less privilege.

The liberal is the active force. But so far from being revolutionary, as he thinks, he is evolutionary. In striving for bourgeois freedom and fair competition he produces by this very action an increase in the social restraints he hates. He builds up the big bourgeoisie in trying to support the little, although he may make himself a big bourgeois in the process. He increases unfairness by trying to secure fairness. Free trade gives birth to tariffs, imperialism, and monopoly, because it is hastening the development of bourgeois economy, and these things are the necessary end of bourgeois development. He calls into being the things he loathes because, as long as he is in the grip of the bourgeois illusion that freedom consists in absence of social planning, he must put himself, by loosening

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social ties, more powerfully in the grip of coercive social forces.

This "revolutionary" liberal, this hater of coercion and violence, this lover of free competition, this friend of liberty and human rights, is therefore the very man damned by history not merely to be powerless to stop these things, but to be forced by his own efforts to produce coercion and violence and unfair competition and slavery. He does not merely refrain from opposing bourgeois violence, he generates it, by helping on the development of bourgeois economy.

Insofar as he is a genuine pacifist and not merely a completely muddled man hesitating between the paths of revolution and non-cooperation, his thesis is this: "I hate violence and war and social oppression, and all these things are due to social relations. I must therefore abstain from social relations. Belligerent and revolutionary alike are hateful to me."

But to abstain from social relations is to abstain from life. As long as he draws or earns an income, he participates in bourgeois economy and upholds the violence which sustains it. He is in sleeping partnership with the big bourgeoisie, and that is the essence of bourgeois economy. If two other countries are at war, he is powerless to intervene and stop them, for that means social cooperation—social cooperation issuing in coercion, like a man separating quarrelling friends—and that action is by his definition barred to him. If the big bourgeoisie of his own country decide to go to war and mobilize the coercive forces, physical and moral, of the state, he can do nothing real, for the only real answer is cooperation with the proletariat to resist the coercive action of the big bourgeoisie and oust them from power. If fascism develops, he cannot suppress it in the bud before it has built up an army to intimidate the proletariat, for he believes in "free speech." He can only watch the workers being bludgeoned and beheaded by the forces he allowed to develop.

His position rests firmly on the bourgeois fallacy. He thinks that man as an individual has power. He does not see that even in the unlikely event of everyone's taking his viewpoint and saying, "I will passively resist," his purpose will still not be achieved. For men cannot in fact cease to cooperate, because

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society's work must be carried on—grain must be reaped, clothes spun, electricity generated, or man will perish from the earth. Only his position as a member of a parasitic class could have given him any other illusion. A worker sees that his very life depends on economic cooperation and that this cooperation of itself imposes social relations which in bourgeois economy must be bourgeois, that is, must in greater or less measure give into the hands of the big bourgeoisie the violent issues of life and death. Passive resistance is not a real program, but an apology for supporting the old program. A man either participates in bourgeois economy, or he revolts and tries to establish another economy. Another apparent road is to break up society and return to the jungle, the solution of *anarchy*. But that is no solution at all. The only real alternative to bourgeois economy is proletarian economy, i.e., socialism, and therefore one either participates in bourgeois economy or is a proletarian revolutionary. The fact that one participates passively in bourgeois economy, that one does not oneself wield the bludgeon or fire the cannon, so far from being a defense really make one's position more disgusting, just as a fence is more unpleasant than a burglar, and a pimp than a prostitute. One lets others do the dirty work and merely participates in the benefit. The bourgeois pacifist occupies perhaps the most ignoble place of a man in any civilization. He is the Christian Protestant whose ethics have been made ridiculous by the development of the culture that evolved them; but this does not prevent his deriving complacency from observing them. He sits on the head of the worker and, while the big bourgeois kicks him, advises him to lie quiet.

Pacifism, for all its specious moral aspect, is, like Protestant Christianity, the creed of ultra-individualism and selfishness. This selfishness is seen in all the defenses the bourgeois pacifist makes of his creed.

The first defense is that it is wrong. It is a "sin" to slay or resort to violence. Christ forbids it. The pacifist who resorts to violence imbrues his soul with heinous guilt. In this conception nothing appears as important but the pacifist's own soul. It is this precious soul of his that he is worrying about, like the good bourgeoise about her honor which is such an important social

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asset. Society can go to the devil if his soul is intact. So imbued is he with bourgeois notions of sin, that it never occurs to him that a preoccupation with one's own soul and one's own salvation is selfish. It may be that a man is right to save his own skin before all; that the pacifist above all must prevent the contamination of his precious soul by the moral sin of violence. But what is this but the translation into spiritual terms of the good old bourgeois rule of *laissez-faire* and bourgeoisdom—may the devil take the hindmost? It is a spiritual *laissez-faire*. It is a belief that the interests of society—God's purpose—are best served by not performing any action, however beneficial to others, if it would imperil one's own "soul." This is crystallized in the maxim, "One may not do ill that good may come of it."

Some pacifists, however, make a different defense. They are not concerned with their own souls. They are only thinking of others. Pacifism is the only way to stop violence and oppression. Violence breeds violence; oppression breeds oppression. How far is this argument well grounded and not merely a rationalization of the bourgeois illusion?

No pacifist has yet explained the causal chain by which non-resistance ends violence. It is true that it does so in this obvious way, that if no resistance is made to violent commands, no violence is necessary to enforce them. Thus if A does everything B asks him, it will not be necessary for B to use violence. But a dominating relation of this kind is in essence violent, although violence is not overtly shown. Subjection is subjection, and rapacity rapacity, even if the weakness of the victim, or the fear inspired by the victor, makes the process non-forcible. Non-resistance will not prevent it, any more than the lack of claws on the part of prey prevents carnivores battening on them. On the contrary, the carnivore selects as his victim animals of the kind. The remedy is the elimination of carnivores, that is, the extinction of classes that live by preying on others.

Another assumption is that man, being what he is, the sight of his defenseless victims will arouse his pity. Now this assumption is not in itself ridiculous, but it needs examination. Is it a historical fact that the defenselessness of his victims has ever aroused man's pity? History records millions of opposite

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cases, of Tamburlane and his atrocities. Attila and his Huns (checked only by violence), Mohammedan incursions, primitive slayings, the Danes and their monastic massacres. Can anyone in good faith advance the proposition that non-resistance defeats violence? How could slave-owning states exist, if peaceful submission touched the hearts of the conquerors? How could man bear to slaughter perpetually the dumb unresisting races of sheep, swine, and oxen?

Moreover, the argument makes the usual bourgeois error of eternalizing its categories, the belief that there is a kind of abstract Robinson Crusoe man of whose actions definite predictions can be made. But how can one seriously subsume under one category Tamburlane, Socrates, a Chinese mandarin, a modern Londoner, an Aztec priest, a Paleolithic hunter, and a Roman galley-slave? There is no abstract man, but men in different networks of social relations, with similar heredities but molded into different proclivities by education and the constant pressure of social being.

Today, it is man in bourgeois social relations with whom we are concerned. Of what effect would it be if we no longer resisted violence, if England, for example, at the beginning of the Great War, had passively permitted Germany to occupy Belgium, and accept without resistance all that Germany wished to do?

There is this much truth in the pacifist argument: that a country in a state of bourgeois social relations cannot act like a nomad horde. Bourgeoisdom has discovered that Tamburlane exploitation does not pay so well as bourgeois exploitation. It is of no use to a bourgeois to sweep over a country, to lift all the wine and fair women and gold thereof and sweep out again. The fair women grow old and ugly, the wine is drunk, and the gold avails for nothing but ornaments. That would be Dead Sea fruit in the mouth of bourgeois culture, which lives on an endless diet of profit and a perpetual domination.

Bourgeois culture has discovered that what pays is bourgeois violence. This is more subtle and less overt than Tamburlane violence. Roman violence, which consisted in bringing home not only fair women and gold, but slaves also, and making them

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work in the household, farms, and mines, occupied a mid-position. Bourgeois culture has discovered that those social relations are most profitable to the bourgeois which do not include rapine and personal slavery, but on the contrary forbid it. Therefore the bourgeois, wherever he has conquered non-bourgeois territory, such as Australia, America, Africa, or India, has imposed bourgeois, not Tamburlane, social relations. In the name of liberty, self-determination, and democracy, or sometimes without these names, they enforce the bourgeois essence, private property, and the ownership of the means of production for profit, and its necessary prerequisite, the free laborer forced to dispose of his labor, for a wage, in the market. This priceless bourgeois discovery has produced material wealth beyond the dreams of a Tamburlane or a Croesus.

Thus, even if the pacifist dream was realized, bourgeois violence would go on. But in fact it would not be realized. How could a bourgeois coercive state submit to having its source of profits violently taken away by another bourgeois state, and not use all the sources of violence at its disposal to stop it? Would it not rather disrupt the whole internal fabric of its state than permit such a thing? Fascism and Nazism, bloodily treading the road to bankruptcy, are evidence of this. Bourgeois economy, because it is unplanned, will cut its own throat rather than reform, and pacifism is only the expression of this last-ditch stand of bourgeois culture, which will at the best rather do nothing than do the thing that will end the social relations on which it is based.

Have we the courage to realize forcibly our views? What guarantee have we of their truth? The only real guarantee *is* action. We have the courage to enforce our beliefs upon physical matter, to build up the material substratum of society in houses, roads, bridges, and ships, despite the risk to human life, because our theories, generated by action, are tested in action. Let the bridge fall, the ship sink, the house collapse if we are wrong. We have investigated the causality of nature; let it be proved upon ourselves if we are wrong.

Exactly the same applies to social relations. Bridges have collapsed before now, cultures have moldered in decay, vast

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civilizations have foundered, but they did not decay uselessly. From each mistake we have learned something, and the Tamburlane society, the slave-owning society, the feudal society, proved upon the test of action have failed. Yet it has only been partial failure; with each we learned a little more, just as the most recent bridge embodies lessons learned from the collapse of the first. Always the lesson was the same, it was the violence, the dominating relation between master and slave, lord and serf, bourgeois and proletarian, which was the weakness in the bridge.

But the pacifist, like all bourgeois theoreticians, is obsessed with the lazy lust of the absolute. "Give me," they all cry, "absolute truth, absolute justice, some rule-of-thumb standard by which I can evade the strenuous task of finding the features of reality by intimate contact with it in action. Give me some logical talisman, some philosopher's stone, by which I can test all acts in theory and say, this is right. Give me some principle such as: *Violence is wrong,* so that I can simply refrain from all violent action and know that I am right." But the only absolute they find is the standard of bourgeois economy. "Abstain from social action." Standards are made, not found.

Man cannot live without acting. Even to cease to act, to let things go their own way, is a form of acting, as when I drop a stone that perhaps starts an avalanche. And since man is always acting, he is always exerting force, always altering or maintaining the position of things, always revolutionary or conservative. Existence is the exercise of force on the physical environment and on other men. The web of physical and social relations that binds men into one universe ensures that nothing we do is without its effect on others, whether we vote or cease to vote, whether we help the police or let them go their way, whether we let two combatants fight or separate them forcibly or assist one against the other, whether we let a man starve to death or move heaven and earth to assist him. Man can never rest on the absolute; all acts involve consequences, and it is man's task to find out these consequences and act accordingly. He can never choose between action and inaction; he can only choose between life and death. He can never absolve himself

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with the ancient plea, "My intentions were good," or "I meant it for the best," or "I have broken no commandment." Even savages have a more vital conception than this, with whom an act is judged by its consequences, even as a bridge is judged by its stability. Therefore it is man's task to find out the consequences of acts: which means discovering the laws of social relations, the impulses, causes, and effects of history.

Thus it is beside the point to ask the pacifist whether he would have defended Greece from the Persian or his sister from a would-be ravisher. Modern society imposes a different and more concrete issue. Under which banner of violence will he impose himself? The violence of bourgeois relations, or the violence not only to resist them but to end them? Bourgeois social relations are revealing, more and more insistently, the violence of exploitation and dispossession on which they are founded; more and more they harrow man with brutality and oppression. By abstaining from action the pacifist enrolls himself under this banner, the banner of things as they are and getting worse, the banner of the increasing violence and coercion exerted by the *haves* on the *have-nots*. He calls increasingly into being the violences of poverty, deprivation, artificial slumps, artistic and scientific decay, fascism, and war.

Or he can enroll himself under the revolutionary banner of things as they will be. In doing so he accepts the stern necessity that he who is to replace a truth or an institution or a system of social relations, must substitute a better, that he who is to pull down a bridge, however inefficient, must put instead a better bridge. Bourgeois social relations were better perhaps than slave-owning; what can the revolutionary find better than them? And, having found them, how is he to bring them about? For one must not only plan the bridge, one must see how it is to be built, by violence, by force, by blasting the living rock and tugging and sweating at the stones that make it.

The issue is socialism versus capitalism. I am for socialism because I am for humanity. We have been cursed with the reign of gold long enough. Money constitutes no proper basis of civilization. The time has come to regenerate society—we are on the eve of a universal change.

—*Eugene V. Debs*

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BOOKS

PENTAGONISM OR IMPERIALISM?

BY RICHARD B. Du BOFF

Pentagonism: A Substitute for Imperialism, by Juan Bosch. Grove Press, New York, 1968; $5.00.

For the socialist Left, this book raises one issue, suggested by its title. Is "pentagonism" a substitute for imperialism or a means for carrying it out?

Juan Bosch's view, shared in many left-wing circles these days, is the first, and he makes his case as follows. The old, classical imperialism, defined in terms recalling the Hobson-Lenin economics of surplus capital and a colonialist search for investment outlets and markets, is now extinct, "a shadow of the past." It has been "replaced by a superior force . . . by pentagonism." The reason for this shift is that America today must be understood as an outgrowth of "mass society" and "overdeveloped capitalism." Spiraling productivity in the economy, combined with a receptive social environment—a class structure built upon faceless blue- and white-collar workers whose culture is super-consumption, nothing else—has opened the gates for a sort of post-imperialist power elite. The new ruling class comprises military managers, corporate executives, and government bureaucrats who don't need "colonial territories in order to accumulate profits." They reap them in an easier way—at the expense of their own nation. They appropriate and exploit the resources of their own people by brainwashing, overtaxing, drafting them; anything to sustain the pentagonist juggernaut. However, to keep their citizen-subjects in the required state of submissiveness, the pentagonists continually have to justify their power. In other words, they have to be able to put it to use from time to time, even without any legitimate

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reasons. This is accomplished by uncovering foreign "threats" to American security. (Bosch refers to the "need to establish the [pentagonist] doctrine of defensive wars waged outside the country.") Every effort at revolutionary change anywhere in the world is immediately taken as a "war of aggression against the United States which must be answered by the military power of the country, just as if it were an armed invasion coming from outside the national territory." (p. 92)

One summary is worth quoting at length:

> The fact is that the use of military power has not changed; what has changed is the purpose for which it is used. The military forces of a pentagonist country are not sent out to conquer colonial territories. War has another purpose . . . to conquer positions of power in the pentagonist country, not in some far-off land. What is being sought is not a place to invest surplus capital for profit; what is being sought is access to the generous economic resources being mobilized for industrial war production . . . profits where arms are manufactured, not where they are employed, and these profits are obtained in the pentagonist mother country, not in the country that is being attacked. A contract for bombers brings in several times more profit, in a much shorter time, than the conquest of the richest mining territory. . . . The planes are built at home, and this is where the fabulous sums produced by the contract are earned. These sums come out of the pockets of the pentagonized people, who are at the same time the mother country and the seat of pentagonist power. The pentagonized people are exploited as colonies were since they are the ones who pay. . . . The mother country thus turns its own people into its best colony. (pp. 21-22)

How and when was this pentagonist leviathan born? Suddenly and, in historical terms, discretely, according to Bosch. Until the 1930's the United States was an "individualist, juridical" society where power lay in bourgeois-democratic hands, in parliamentary bodies. The next decade brought a radical transformation. Because of the Second World War "imperialism entered its death throes," and the 1941-1945 mobilization and Cold War that followed opened up the possibility—unparalleled in American history—for a military-industrial complex to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of imperialism and its social pillars. Dynamic pressures now had to be turned inward, not outward. Thus, *domestic* exploitation became the one source of political power available to the emergent pentagonists, and they made the most of their op-

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portunity. As already pointed out, they maintain the control they were able to seize by externalizing threats to the status quo; hence the foreign wars and interventions, which in turn provide them their *raison d'être,* and so on. A tight feedback mechanism, one so compelling that its beneficiaries "can plan, and carry out, a long-range policy that allows [them] to come into possession of the effective command structures in national life in the field of non-military administration." (p. 125)

Just a few years ago, in 1961-1962, words like these would have seemed fantastic coming from Juan Bosch. At that time Trujillo had just been assassinated, and Bosch, a liberal reformer, had returned to the Dominican Republic to triumph in the first free elections held there in thirty-eight years. With that, the Kennedy administration in Washington hitched its own wagon to the Bosch star. The newly elected Dominican President became a Free World savior, a "democratic alternative" to Fidel Castro in Latin America. Then, in September 1963, the Bosch government was overthrown by a conservative, landlord-supported military coup, recognized three months later by the United States. Bosch went into exile in Puerto Rico until April 1965, when a popular uprising in his favor came close to restoring him to power, only to be brutally smashed at the last moment by 24,000 U.S. troops. In 1966, after this "Inter-American Peace Force" had cleaned out the "Communists and subversives," elections were carried out under the eyes of the Organization of American States and planeloads of American observers. Bosch was defeated by Joaquín Balaguer, a conservative with links to international finance and a "go-between" whose conciliatory role was sweetened by massive U.S. aid: dollars and food for the good guys and a CIA reign of terror for the bad guys.

Such experiences would leave a scar on any man; their impact upon Bosch has been increasingly evident since 1965. *Pentagonism,* in this perspective, marks one more step in a personal metamorphosis which is carrying the author further away from his earlier Social Democratic, anti-Communist moorings (reflected, for example, in his 1964 book, *The Unfinished Experiment: Democracy in the Dominican Republic*). By late 1967, in a series of articles published from his new exile in Spain, Bosch was calling for "popular dictatorships" established by force as the only answer for the economic and social miseries of Latin America. He saw these dictatorships as the sole alternative to Communist-led revolutions, but nonetheless added that between an American and a

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Communist solution, his own choice would be clear: "I'd rather die a Communist than die being pro-Yankee."*

So another political figure comes full circle. He joins the ranks of those the world over who have learned the hard way, by discovering first-hand what it means to try to oppose, or negotiate with, or for that matter reason with, a star-spangled colossus bent on domination. This, in stark relief, is what U.S. power does to *moderate* leaders who desire little more than some measure of political and economic independence for their own people. It crushes and humiliates them; it leaves them with no choice but to become revolutionaries.

Latin America isn't the only region where this holds true. Greece, a good bet to become the next Vietnam, represents another case history where U.S. power and influence were used to destroy moderate, even anti-Communist, leaders who attempted to defy Washington (that is, to chart an independent path of their own choosing). Significantly, in the wake of similar experiences suffered at American hands, Andreas Papandreou shares Bosch's views on U.S. foreign policy and the way it imposes its own militarized processes on satellite nations. Recently he wrote that the April 21, 1967 military coup in Greece, in which the American Ambassador and CIA were intimately involved, "represents a new phenomenon. . . . The colonels did not have the support of any political party, *any class interest,* or any region of the nation. . . . Thus the Greek coup belongs to a new species of coups. It is the outgrowth of the enhancement of the power of the military-intelligence complex in the context of the Cold War, and it constitutes a warning to the countries of the West. For it is no longer true that 'it can't happen here.'" (*Columbia University Forum,* Winter 1968. Italics added.)

If it is easy to understand, then, why Bosch feels as he does, and why similar views are held by so many left-liberals, it may be less easy to accept *Pentagonism.* For as I see it, there is one absolutely essential point of departure for books that deal with any aspect of America's relations with the rest of the world: American foreign policy as a factor in international politics is at least seven decades old. It follows that it is the first task of the serious writer

* Robert Berrellez, Associated Press, October 1, 1967. See also Bosch's review of Régis Debray and the present situation in Latin America in *The New York Review of Books,* October 26, 1967, reprinted in *Régis Debray and the Latin American Revolution,* Huberman and Sweezy, eds., Monthly Review Press, 1968.

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to find out whether there is a pattern to it, against which any departures or unusual features might be compared or measured.

Here Bosch stumbles. His historical analysis is badly flawed, and it leads him into a number of political and economic misconceptions, all of which point in one direction: that in general pentagonism *hasn't replaced* imperialism, it *has been serving* it. The pentagonist story begins many decades before Bosch picks it up in the 1950's and 1960's; and if its theme, an aggressive and militarized set of foreign policy institutions, has grown more strident and frightening since the Second World War, the reason appears to be that American ruling circles consider these changes necessary to undergird imperial expansion in a world full of new dangers and challenges. A higher level of "military security" is required to carry out in today's world what have long been the cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy—expansion and counterrevolution.

First, however, a brief digression, apart from the American case. Why does Bosch think that pentagonist-type institutions are so unique in Western history and that only post-Second World War United States has produced them? Before the First World War, well before America's military-industrial complex, they were already in evidence in imperialist nations, notably Germany. Nearly everything Bosch observes in the United States today had its rough counterpart in the 1871-1918 Reich: an aggressive, integral nationalism imbued with a sense of mission; close links among finance, industry, and the military; "Great Society" welfare sops thrown to the working class to undercut the growth of socialism; a bloated state bureaucracy staffed by mandarins; a surly impatience with international legalities and world opinion; the violation of Belgian neutrality in 1914, later matched by the U.S. subversion of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords. Yet an even more apt historical example might be the Reich of 1933-1945, the Nazi Germany that created the first "permanent war economy." This is certainly what the United States represents at present, and Bosch deserves credit for emphasizing that fact in any way he can. In this light, though, pentagonism doesn't turn out to be a new phenomenon, even in its superdeveloped and highly lethal American variety.

As for the United States itself, this is a nation with a long and consistent history of expansionism, both within and outside continental North America. It had a "Vietnam" from 1898 to 1913 in the Philippines and a "Dominican Republic" several times in

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the past throughout Central America and the Caribbean. Bosch, himself Latin American, must be familiar with this history, but presumably he would dismiss it as irrelevant on the grounds that during these earlier times the United States was steering a classical, traditional imperialist course (which, as he argues, faded out with the Second World War). The trouble with this line of thought is that even then, before the 1920's, American imperialism defied the classical model, as it does today. Its expansionist policies were always fundamentally different from British, French, and German. Commercial and financial penetration—the "Open Door"—stood out then, and still stands out, as the chief American stratagem, with outright territorial occupation playing a secondary role. "Informal empire," to borrow William Appleman Williams' label, was the vision of American statesmen beginning in the 1890's;* and it well describes the modern version known as the "free world" or *Pax Americana.*

Furthermore, if American imperialism failed to conform to the classical model from 1890 to 1914, it can scarcely be expected to have conformed to it in the years following, in face of the upheavals in world politics, economics, and finance which have ceaselessly thrown new challenges at the United States, the leading imperialist power of the twentieth century. Three successful anti-capitalist revolutions (Russia, China, Cuba) and their unfolding into a rival social system, two world wars, a catastrophic depression and several recessions, one collapse of the international financial system and three or four close calls, persistent social crises which produce fascist regimes at worst and unrelenting poverty, inequality, and public-sector squalor at best—in our lifetime events like these have made Western capitalism something less than irresistibly attractive for the underdeveloped "third world" nations. Confronted with this precarious state of affairs, this ominous drift of history (John F. Kennedy was obsessed by that), imperialist powers have naturally tried to develop a new and enlarged range of responses. More flexible methods of penetration, control, and domination are tested out; their mix varies and their emphasis shifts, from the economic to the political to —enter Bosch, Papandreou and company—the military or proxy-military (support for junta regimes). But through all these variations in the forms of imperialism, its substance has to be kept

* The definitive account of this critical period is Walter LaFeber, *The New Empire. An Interpretation of American Expansion 1860-1898,* Cornell, 1963 (in paperback).

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clearly in focus, for there is no evidence that it has changed in any material way. Whether its most striking external characteristic at any moment happens to be economic or political or military, its almost instinctive goal remains the building up of a network of rewards and compulsions ("carrots and sticks") to help it direct the internal affairs of foreign nations enough (1) to guarantee key profit-makers at home continued access to "resource areas" (to use the current State Department jargon); (2) to furnish some assurance that future expansion in these areas won't be closed off by the rise of hostile or "Communist" governments; and (3) to protect against the spread of revolutions that might set bad examples for other nations.

For me, this formula offers the only way to reconcile otherwise contradictory behavior on the part of the American ruling class—unless it is assumed that its behavior is essentially planless and just happens to fit a mold artificially imposed upon it. If its most prominent features since 1945 have been "pentagonist," the reason would be that the American empire is far bigger—maybe overextended—and harder to defend without recourse to war. But here too the decisions to deploy such a gigantic war machine were made by civilians, not soldiers. The civilians were the first to define the world in military terms and the first to call in the military, before 1941. And I find no evidence that they have lost *ultimate* control over their offspring, à la Frankenstein. The public statements, speeches, and acts of men like Dean Acheson, Robert Lovett, James Forrestal, George C. Marshall, John Foster Dulles, Douglas Dillon, John J. McCloy, George Ball, Dean Rusk, the brothers Bundy and Rostow, and others at the center of U.S. policy-making indicate very emphatically that the expansion of American military power around the globe was undertaken by the civilian leadership,* to secure the Free Enterprise World

* Another prime example of the civilians behind the military is Nelson Rockefeller who, although on the margin of the formal policy-making apparatus, has still had as much influence as any other single individual. See the review of his long and hawkish career, in *I. F. Stone's Weekly,* July 22, 1968. On the general question of civilians promoting the military buildup, see William A. Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Dell, 1962 ed.), pp. 184-186; and on the background of these decisions, which were tied up with the origins of the Cold War, David Horowitz, *The Free World Colossus,* Hill and Wang, 1965; Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1966,* Wiley, 1967 (both in paperback); and Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War, 1943-1945,* Random House, 1969.

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MONTHLY REVIEW PRESS SPRING LIST

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

NEW CLOTH BOOKS

SOCIALISM IN CUBA by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy

Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy's new book on Cuba makes a sympathetic but realistic appraisal of the Cuban Revolution after ten years, and reaches some important new conclusions. The authors discuss health and education, where there have been truly amazing advances, and the economic field, where obstacles resulting from centuries of underdevelopment are formidable.

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THE AGE OF IMPERIALISM: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy by Harry Magdoff



A collection of four articles that originally appeared in *Monthly Review*, plus an introductory chapter which discusses various approaches to the subject of imperialism. In the rediscovery of imperialism that is now going on, no work has been more important than that of Harry Magdoff, and the chapters which have already appeared have aroused enormous interest throughout the world. $6.00/54s

GUATEMALA: OCCUPIED COUNTRY by Eduardo Galeano



Eduardo Galeano, who lived with the guerrillas, gives a devastating picture of Guatemala, and a full account of the CIA-sponsored coup of 1954. He describes the Indian population, on whose aching shoulders the economy rests; the living conditions of a people three-fourths of whom live on less than twenty cents a day; and U.S. corporate exploitation and the failure of the Alliance for Progress. Special attention is given to the development of the guerrilla movement, and important guerrilla documents are appended.

$5.95/54s



The Socialist Register 1969 *will also be published in the near future, but we have no date as yet. Please wait for the announcement.*

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

LONG MARCH, SHORT SPRING: The Student Uprising at Home and Abroad by Barbara and John Ehrenreich

The authors are activists in the American student movement and traveled widely in Europe during the summer of 1968. In chapters on France, Italy, England, Germany, and Columbia University, they describe the events of the past several years to place them in perspective and trace the course of development in each locale. The concluding portion of the book develops an arresting theory of the worldwide student upheaval. $5.95/54s

THE EXPLOSION: MARXISM AND THE FRENCH UPHEAVAL by Henri Lefebvre



The author, one of the world's foremost Marxist sociologists and a professor at Nanterre, sets himself the task of beginning the reorientation which the events of the spring of 1968 in France are bound to inspire. Taking as a starting point the issues raised by the new world student movement—quality of life, spontaneity of revolt, possibility of self-management in industry and institutions, etc.—Professor Lefebvre's thought ranges far beyond the streets of Paris in his attempt to develop a theory of political power today. $5.95/54s



IRAN: THE NEW IMPERIALISM IN ACTION by Bahman Nirumand

Bahman Nirumand, an Iranian who was a professor in Germany until his recent expulsion from that country, here tells the story of the CIA coup in Iran in 1953, and the exploitation by the international oil consortium. The book, a best-seller in Germany when first published, played a role in inspiring the Berlin demonstrations against the Shah that heralded the modern German student movement. $6.95/56s

VIETNAM WILL WIN! by Wilfred Burchett

This book, says David Dellinger, will be read "by thousands of bewildered experts in the U.S. military, diplomatic and foreign subversion agencies who cannot figure out on their own how the mighty United States could be so thoroughly defeated by tiny 'backward' Vietnam." (Published by *The Guardian*, distributed by Monthly Review Press; sorry, we can't offer an Associates' reduction on books we distribute for others.)
cloth $7.50/70s; paper $2.45/21s

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against all threats, external and—especially—internal. This military-intelligence establishment was created to serve a preconceived function; aside from the blunders typical of any military establishment, it has done its job fairly well, and in a greater variety of ways than could have been imagined twenty years ago. Thus, while Marxists talk about "unity of theory and practice," capitalists achieve it.

Of course at this advanced stage of American imperialism, it really doesn't pay to make a neat and tidy distinction between means and ends (let alone between Boschian "pentagonism" and "imperialism"). They feed on each other, they interlock and reinforce. There is, as Harry Magdoff has put it, an "underlying unity. . . . Economic control, military control, and political control mutually support and stimulate each other." (MR, November 1968). As the military blazes paths for the economic, the economic aids and profits from the military. In 1961, for instance, the Kennedy administration set up a special Defense Department office to increase export sales of arms, as one means to reduce the balance of payments deficit. Later, the Export-Import Bank, supposedly an "aid" agency, was brought in to extend credits to underdeveloped countries to assist them in purchasing U.S. arms. Through mid-1967, $12.6 billion of sales were rung up. "These sales," stated the then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, "are employing American labor and they are providing profits to American business. I think we should be encouraged and congratulated on making these arrangements." (*New York Times,* July 23, 1967)

The same intertwined relationships exist in the actual sites of American intervention as well. Direct economic interests in Vietnam were small in 1953 when Dulles and Eisenhower began to worry about losing its potential "tin and tungsten" resources to the native Communists. A dozen years later, with escalation and (attempted) pacification, money and entrepreneurial energy started to follow the troops in. Eugene Black of the World Bank and, after him, David Lilienthal of the Development and Resources Corporation, got busy programming "postwar development . . . a general economic strategy for the postwar period" to be linked to the United States and Japan (*New York Times,* November 14, 1966; October 29, 1967; and Lilienthal in *Foreign Affairs,* January, 1969). Laos, the tortured stepchild of the Vietnam war, also finds itself being pulled into this "development"

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mill. American spending at present accounts for "virtually all of the national income of Laos, including a 50 percent subsidy of the national budget. . . . One highly placed American official recently estimated that the United States last year contributed at least $100 for every man, woman, and child in Laos." (*New York Times,* January 17, 1969). Now, forty miles north of Vientiane, the World Bank, headed by McNamara, is financing a $33-million hydropower project which will eventually generate electricity for export to Thailand, a notorious U.S. client state.

Turning to Bosch's own country, the same mutually reinforcing factors are again conspicuous. U.S. investment had taken root there long before the April 1965 invasion (and in part explains it: Ellsworth Bunker and the sugar lobby). But since the invasion the environment has become still safer for free enterprise, and a renewed wave of expansion is under way. An "international consortium to develop agriculture and industry in the Dominican Republic" was launched last year and supported by the Balaguer government, which is providing 200,000 acres of its own land and $15 million of initial funds, the latter a loan from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The developers in this case include Dow Chemical, International Harvester, and Studebaker-Worthington. (*New York Times,* April 16, 1968)

Any book that helps draw world attention to the dangerous, pathological tendencies in American society today has to be welcomed on that account alone. For a treatment of the sheer militarism that has eaten its way into virtually all corners of American life since 1945, it would be hard to improve upon the insights offered by Bosch. Moreover, nobody can dismiss out of hand the possibility of some wild aberration or some bizarre turn of events leading to a "final solution," with our Strangeloves in the Pentagon and CIA fully in command of a ticking Doomsday Machine of one kind or another.

Perhaps. But outside chances are not what social analysis is all about. Thus, *Pentagonism* earns our sympathy, but our criticism as well. It misses the mark in describing U.S. imperialism as one thing prior to the Second World War and something entirely different after it. America's aims abroad have been remarkably consistent through the years; and the means employed to attain them have been a blend of classic Western-capitalist and vintage Yankee. Also, and this may be the key point, Bosch appears to err

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in claiming that the pentagonist tail now wags the imperialist dog. With that thesis, how would he explain why this country is trying to wriggle its way out of Vietnam? Surely the pentagonist complex would prefer to continue, and the new Washington guard of Nixon-Laird-Kissinger, with its ties to the Prussians and geopoliticians of the *arriviste* Right, might like to accommodate them. The elders of the system, however, have clearly had enough. Wall Street, the multinational corporations, the foundation technocrats, the major news media, the international bankers all understand that the Vietnam intervention was essentially "correct," but that the tenacity of Vietnamese resistance was disastrously underestimated. The military and its civilian spokesmen sold them a bill of goods, and its cost has become unbearably high. The enterprise has got to be liquidated—and it probably will be. It remains to be seen whether pentagonist pressure can hold out for long against that.

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POVERTY AND AFFLUENCE IN BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO, March 27—A baby boy in Brazil's impoverished northeastern states received a rubber nursing pacifier. He was happily sucking away when his brother tried to take it from him.

Mother intervened, and the pacifier was restored to the squalling child.

"All right," the older boy declared, "but when baby brother dies, the pacifier is for me. Promise, mother."

Brazil's Minister of Health, Raimundo de Brito, relates this episode, witnessed by a nurse, to indicate the fatalistic attitude of Brazil's poor toward infant mortality. At least 500,000 infants born alive died before reaching their first birthday last year.

—New York Times, March 28, 1965

Brazil's millionaires are still building mansions, entertaining at lavish parties, raising race horses, and traveling with Europe's international set. Some are going in for auto racing and big game hunting in Africa; others have turned to collecting art.

"New millionaires are always popping up," says a Rio de Janeiro interior decorator who works with the wealthy. "There's a meat packer in Rio Grande who writes checks for 3 billion cruzeiros ($1.5 million). He or his company owns five airplanes. But nobody has heard of him."

Says a Sao Paulo industrialist: "Four or five million isn't enough to make you rich nowadays. You need from $7 million up. . . ."

A big share of Brazil's wealth is believed to be in the hands of about 100 individuals or families in Rio de Janeiro, 150 to 200 in Sao Paulo, and another 50 to 150 in other parts of the country. The list is roughly equivalent to a "Who's Who" of Brazilian society.

—Business Week, March 27, 1965

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WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

Socialists-Communists Should Get Together

Can Socialist-Communist parties and organizations get together, decide upon a minimum program, and provide mankind with effective leadership through the existing world crisis? This is not an academic question. The well-being or even the survival of mankind upon the earth may be determined by the answer.

Socialist-Communist parties may be divided into three quite different groups. In Group One are the parties responsible for public administration in the fourteen countries officially engaged in socialist construction. Group Two includes countries like Italy, France, India, and Guyana in which Socialists-Communists are the recognized parliamentary opponents of bourgeois governing parties. In the third group are Socialist-Communist parties representing minority groups.

Parties in Groups One and Two speak in international gatherings with greater authority than the majority of parties which fall into Group Three. They have larger party memberships and play a far more decisive role in making and implementing decisions concerning public policy.

From its early beginnings the Socialist-Communist movement has based its existence on two axioms: Capitalism in its present imperialist stage is essentially competitive while socialism is essentially cooperative; therefore (Axiom II), capitalists use rivalry and war to enforce policy decisions while Socialists-Communists cooperate for security and peace in a planned, justly administered, world order.

While the Soviet Union was the one nation dedicated to building socialism there was no way of testing the validity of these axioms. Since war's end in 1945, with the spread of socialist construction in East Europe and Asia, the axioms have been put to the test of day-to-day practice in the relations between an increasing number of socialist countries.

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From its earliest beginnings the Socialist-Communist movement has held international conferences of political and other groups at which matters of general concern were discussed and decisions were reached which made international socialism-communism a movement with agreed objectives and concrete economic and political demands. Among the most emphatic of the immediate demands was an end to exploitation, to imperialism, and to militarism and war.

War in 1914 split the Socialist movement. In Europe, which was then the geographical center of the Socialist movement, the majority of Socialists accepted war and helped their national governments to fight for victory. A minority, led by Lenin, Liebknecht and Jaurès, denounced war as an instrument of imperialism and demanded peace, bread, and self-determination. These minority groups of Socialists formed the Communist International in 1919. Majority Socialists continued to support the Second, or Socialist, International.

This was not the first division in the ranks of international socialists, but it was decisive for the 1919-1969 half-century, during which Socialist parties continued to function under capitalist governments, while members of the Communist International were planning and building an alternative social system.

The Communist International was dissolved in 1943 under the pressure of war. East European nations building socialism have cooperated sparingly under the Warsaw Pact. But by and large each of the dozen nations engaged in socialist construction has stressed sovereignty, self-determination, and its own particular vital interests. At no time since 1914 has there been an organization that included all political groups dedicated to building a socialist society.

Today there are Socialist parties and Communist parties in most developed countries and many developing countries. For the most part they carry on their activities inside national frontiers. There is a Socialist International of sorts. Since 1943 there has not been a functioning Communist International, though Communist parties have held international conferences.

A few Socialist parties are nationally strong. Internationally they are ineffective. Socialists and Communists have been

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feuding since 1919. Sharp separation of the two groups has continued down to the present day. Socialist and Communist parties do not meet each other internationally to discuss their common problems.

The Communist parties are segmented and divided by national frontiers. The most notorious split among the Communists is that between Peking and Moscow, heading the two numerically largest parties on earth. Since 1960 the breach between the Chinese and Russian Communist parties has extended to Communist parties all over the world. Among Communist parties a majority sides officially with Moscow, only a minority siding with Peking. In some countries the Communist parties have split into a Moscow faction and a Peking faction.

The majority of Communist parties, siding with Moscow, have been trying for two years to hold a sorely needed international conference in which the issues facing socialism-communism can be thrashed out and a common program adopted. In 1968 such a meeting seemed possible. The Russian-led Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in that year dimmed the hope. Instead of being stamped out, nationalism and factional splits and conflicts seem to have escalated.

The general crisis of capitalist imperialism, the threat of nuclear war, and the headlong plunge into the untried and the unknown initiated by the revolutions in science and technology, raise questions of theory and procedure for which the bourgeois world has been able to provide only vague, sketchy, and tentative answers. At this critical point history offers Socialists-Communists an opportunity to take the lead and provide mankind with an alternative to the existing economic-social pattern.

If Christians, despite centuries of splits and schisms, have been able at last to get together for ecumenical (all-inclusive) conferences in Rome, why cannot Socialists and Communists, despite decades of differences and factional conflicts, get together for all-inclusive conferences representing all those who wish to build human brotherhood in a cooperating planet-wide society?

History is offering the Socialists-Communists a fantastic opportunity: to come together, to negotiate their differences, to

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agree on a minimal program, to establish a united front such as that which has recently won a smashing victory in West Bengal, and to offer the human race a way out of the dead-end street in which it finds itself today.

United we stand, divided we fall. Socialists and Communists have preached cooperation for a century. Nineteen sixty-nine should be the year in which they convert their theories into practice.

Fifty Thousand Are Condemned to Death

A close friend writes that his oldest son, his pride and joy, has been killed in an automobile accident on icy winter roads. If this happened once, it would be lamentable. When it happens many times every day it becomes horrible and criminal.

The facts speak for themselves:

MOTOR-VEHICLE ACCIDENTAL DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES

	Deaths	*For 100,000 population*
1960	38,137	21
1962	40,804	22
1963	43,564	23
1964	47,700	24
1965	49,163	25
1966	53,041	27
1967	53,100 (est.)	27

(*World Almanac,* 1969, p. 759)

I wrote my friend expressing sympathy for his irretrievable loss. In the letter I included this sermonette:

"This is a rough world in which we are living. The death toll is heavy.

"When I was a boy, the symbol of power and speed was the locomotive. In our part of the country no locomotive ran forty miles per hour. Most speeds were less.

"Locomotive engineers were trained, experienced, mature men, presumably reliable and dependable.

"Today the symbol of land speed is the automobile. Your Volvo ran easily at 120 miles per hour. At this speed any fault,

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mechanical or human, may mean death for those inside and outside of the vehicle.

"Actually, in the United States alone more than fifty thousand people are put to death each year in motor vehicle accidents. By way of comparison, in three years of the Korean War United States battle deaths totalled 33,629.

"In the face of this deadly threat to life and well-being, we allow anyone who can get a license to drive a car on the public highways. The result, measured in injury and death, is a continuing major disaster, greater than that of most local wars.

"These terrible and often catastrophic losses which decimate the population occur in a world governed by habit and custom rather than by reason.

"You and I both wish it were otherwise. Surely it is up to us to do something about it."

A Sputnik Magazine

Sputnik is a monthly magazine edited on Pushkin Square, Moscow. It has an English edition with worldwide distribution and an American office at 155 West 15th Street, New York City 10011 (twelve issues: $5). The December 1968 issue (186 pages, with many superb photographs and a bare minimum of advertising) featured a long illustrated article, "Music and Children," devoted to musical education in the Soviet Union:

- Music is one of the subjects taught in all Russian public schools and in special music schools.
- The popularity of music education in the Soviet Union can be judged from the fact that the existing 4,500 music schools are unable to meet the demand for enrollment.
- In the 1967-1968 scholastic year there were 3,364 music schools with a seven-year curriculum in the Soviet Union. They were attended by 574,000 children, who went there after they had finished classes at general secondary schools.
- About 150,000 children and adolescents attend 1,201 evening music schools. The course at these schools is five years.
- Special music schools, with an eleven-year course, train profes-

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sional musicians. There are 26 such schools in the country. They are attended by 11,000 students who, in addition to special music training, complete the general secondary school curriculum.

Behind the Present Arms Race

Half a century ago—in 1913—seven great empires (Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, Holland and Austro-Hungary) held a substantial monopoly of world power. At that time the United States and Japan were junior partners in this planet-dominating group.

By what means did a handful of nations, located chiefly in Europe, populated by a small minority of the human family, gain this ascendancy? There are three simple answers: Advances in science and technology increased their capacity to turn natural resources into consumer goods and capital goods; they had made similar advances in communication, organization, transportation, and administration; and their sciences and technology had built immense professional military establishments which enabled a white European minority to impose its imperial will on a colored colonial majority of mankind.

Between 1776 and 1917 this white European monopoly of world power was repeatedly called into question. Since 1917 there has been a spectacular shift. The white European imperialists have lost their monopoly both in Asia and Africa. Present-day world powers, in order of their power potential, are: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, West Germany, and probably Japan.

Power confrontation in the early months of 1969 is entirely different from that of 1913. The West, grouped politically in NATO but scattered geographically over Europe and the Americas, with its preponderance of fire-power, faces a dozen countries engaged in building socialism, and three-score of new nations, carved out of the 1913 colonial empires and huddled in the U.N. These two non-Western groups contain the overwhelming majority of the human family.

NATO Western governments no longer hold the power monopoly which they enjoyed in 1913, though their wealth,

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productive potential, and fire-power make them a formidable enemy. Their cultural position, as champions of Western imperialism and apologists for Western civilization, deprives them of the initiative and puts them on the defensive.

The keystone of the Western position is its fire-power. After two big wars and a score of little ones during the 1913-1969 half century, the peoples of the world are sick of wars and clamoring for disarmament. A disarmed world would be one in which the remnants of nineteenth-century imperialism would have surrendered their capacity to win wars. Hence the stubborn refusal of the West to accept any formula which would put an official end to its superiority in weapons.

Capitalism is dying and its extremities are already decomposing. The blotches upon the surface show that the blood no longer circulates. The time is near when the cadaver will have to be removed and the atmosphere purified.

—*Eugene V. Debs*

Let the liars and hypocrites, the dull-witted and blind, the bourgeois and their supporters hoodwink the people with talk about freedom in general, about equality in general, about democracy in general.

We say to the workers and peasants: Tear the masks from the faces of these liars, open the eyes of these blind ones. Ask them:

Equality between what sex and what other sex?

Between what nation and what other nation?

Between what class and what other class?

Freedom from what yoke, or from the yoke of what class?

Freedom from what class?

Whoever speaks of politics, of democracy, of liberty, of equality, of socialism, and does not at the same time ask these questions, does not put them in the foreground, does not fight against concealing, hushing up and glossing over these questions, is of the worst enemies of the toilers, is a wolf in sheep's clothing, is a bitter opponent of the workers and peasants, is a servant of the landlords, tsars, capitalists.

—*Lenin, Women and Society*

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was left without a labor force.'" (p. 23) A footnote to this passage then explains that "the figure of '3000 persons of the working class' is apparently a misprint as Wakefield, cited by Marx, used the smaller figure." (p. 29) The smaller figure is 300, and this was in the copy from which the article was set. How it got changed back to Marx's 3,000 we do not know. Could it be that we have proofreaders around MR who refuse to believe that Marx could be wrong?

While on the subject of typos, here is another in the March issue: Ken Geering in his letter on "The French Explosion" wrote: "If the chances of winning had miraculously been as high as 'evens,' one still has to examine the results of defeat with far more seriousness than the Review of the Month seems prepared to do." This came out in type as: "If the chances of winning had miraculously been as high as 'events,'. . . ." The trouble here obviously was that whoever read proof was looking at words and not sentences, and indeed that is the way one is often told to read proof. The moral seems to be that one needs to read proof *both* ways.

A generous subscriber has been sending from time to time checks to pay for gift subscriptions for needy students—i.e., those who need MR but either can't afford it or don't yet know they need it. This seems a good idea which others might want to emulate. We would also be glad to have suggestions as to who could benefit from these gift subs, with a brief explanation in each case.

The saga of Ernest Mandel's *Marxist Economic Theory* is nearing its end—at least as far as the books' physical deliverability is concerned. As we go to press we have word that they have arrived from England and are on the dock awaiting customs clearance.

Letters about Leo Huberman keep arriving, nowadays mostly from distant lands where news of his death has reached only recently. A typical letter is one from our friend (by long correspondence) Helen Palmer, editor of *Outlook,* an Australian journal with a political position very similar to MR's. She writes: "I'm one of those who cut their teeth on *Man's Worldly Goods, We, the People,* and other writings in the [British] Left Book Club Days [late 1930's and early 1940's], the LBC being the form in which American left-wing writing reached Australia. Our own pioneer labour historian, the late Brian Fitzpatrick, used to say that his ambition was to write an Austrian labour history in the Huberman vein. He never did, since his own style was so very different, but it illustrates the respect Huberman received from left-wing scholars. Keith Buchanan of New Zealand, who writes for you, said to me the other day that it's interesting to recall how many students of economics and economic history in those days got their real direction not from their lectures but from *Man's Worldly Goods.* He was one." We will only add that *Man's Worldly Goods* is just as good a source of direction today as it was thirty years ago.

From time to time we receive a bequest from a reader who felt, during his lifetime, that financial support would help make possible the continuance of MR as a completely independent magazine. Any reader who may be moved to follow this example should be careful to state exactly, in his or her will, that the bequest is to: "Monthly Review, Inc. of 116 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y. 10011."

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